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Improving motivation and performance in public services
Professor David Marsden’s research showed how matching goals and appraisal to the
different abilities of employees can boost individual and team work. 
What was the problem?
Successive governments in Britain and around the world have sought to link pay to performance in
public services in order to motivate employees more effectively. This approach often fails in
practice. Far from motivating employees, performance-linked pay schemes can trigger
accusations of unfairness and management bad faith.
What did we do?
For more than two decades the LSE Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) has investigated
whether performance-related pay in British public services has helped to improve staff motivation
and performance. Professor of Industrial Relations David Marsden has led the research, aided by
co-researchers Raymond Richardson, Stephen French and Richard Belfield.
Initially the research focused on performance-linked pay systems at the Inland Revenue (as the
British tax service then was), and was subsequently extended to hospitals and to the
government’s employment service. All of these schemes had been designed according to
prevailing best practice.
LSE’s unique dual focus on the economic and organisational implications of performance pay in
the public sector pinpointed weaknesses in the link between incentive and performance, especially
in the processes of goal setting and performance appraisal.
The research helped public sector managers and unions identify the changes necessary to make
their schemes fairer and more effective. These included matching goals and appraisal to the
differing abilities and job demands of individual employees and recognising the part played by
team efforts. Involving employees in establishing their work priorities and measures of
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achievement was also found to be critical. Further to this was the requirement that the goals set
be able to reconcile any tensions between professional values and organisational priorities.
A subsequent study of the new pay system introduced for teachers in 2000 tracked the experience
of a number of schools over four years. This revealed that the appraisal process itself could
improve organisational performance by linking organisational needs and individual performance.
The researchers found that the minority of schools achieving this had also improved pupils’
academic performance over time.
In 2013, Marsden began a new project—welcomed by the professional associations for classroom
and head teachers and by the Department for Education—to examine the impact of the 2013/14
performance pay reforms for teachers on teacher motivation and on management practices within
schools.
Funding for the initial Inland Revenue study came from the Inland Revenue Staff Federation; it
was carried out with management co-operation, notably for distribution and collection of survey
questionnaires. Funding for the second stage came from the Anglo-German Foundation,
conducted as part of a comparative study. Later stages in the research were funded as part of the
Centre’s Economic and Social Research Council and Leverhulme programmes on both industrial




Over the past two decades LSE research has
provided timely, systematic and independent
evidence to support efforts by government and
others to extend and improve the link between pay
and performance across public services in Britain.
In particular, the research encouraged a more
constructive dialogue between management and
unions, revealing to managers that employees had
widespread and genuine concerns, while
demonstrating to unions that their members’ disenchantment with performance-linked pay related
to practice rather than principle.
The research fed directly into practical improvements introduced by public services into their pay
and appraisal schemes. Often such changes were incremental. For example, in response to LSE’s
finding that the Inland Revenue’s scheme unfairly disregarded differences between jobs and
individual abilities, Inland Revenue introduced goals that had been agreed between individual
employees and their line managers. Further LSE research showed that while the measure might
have worked in a less centralised organisation, employees still experienced the goals as divisive,
imposed by managers with little scope for negotiation. This finding in turn influenced a government
inquiry into incentivising change, which led to experiments with team-based performance pay in
the early 2000s.
In the later review on reforming police pay led by former Rail Regulator Tom Winsor, Marsden
briefed members of the Home Office Research and Analysis Unit. Winsor went on to recommend
that police pay should contain a higher proportion devoted to performance, with proper recognition
for teamwork, in line with the findings of LSE’s research.
The impact of LSE research could also be seen in teachers’ pay. The Department for Education
used LSE findings as part of its evidence to the 2012 Teachers’ Pay Review Body, which
recommended an end to increments based on seniority and their replacement with performance-
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related increases for classroom teachers. Also reflecting LSE research, the new system
implemented in 2013/14 sought to give more autonomy to individual schools in how they reward
performance, while seeking to ensure fairness in operation.
International
Because British governments have pushed experiments with performance pay further than
elsewhere, LSE’s research has been of special interest to international bodies promoting better
public management, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the World Bank. The research made a significant contribution to the OECD’s 2005
report on reforming public service pay systems in OECD countries, especially in transition
economies. Via the OECD report, the research filtered into work in China, India and Germany, and
directly into Australian public policy debates about public sector pay reforms.
In 2012 the World Bank explicitly drew on LSE research in its policy research paper on
performance pay in the public sector, prepared for developing economies. This sought to recast
workplace culture by aligning employee effort and pay and resolving the conflict between good
professional performance and public policy objectives.
David Marsden is Professor of Industrial Relations in LSE’s Department of
Management and an Associate in the Labour Markets Research Programme
within the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP). He has worked as an
adviser to the European Commission, the International Labour Organisation,
the OECD, the World Bank, and to various UK trade unions. He joined LSE as
a Lecturer in 1980.
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